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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Leo Lee Fisher appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Fisher was convicted of felony DUI, and his conviction and sentence were 
affirmed on appeal. (R., p. 20.) He filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., 
p. 1.) His claims in the petition were that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object when "[t]he Government violated E.R. 404(b)" and failing to "move to 
suppress improperly obtained JURY SLections." (R., p. 2 (capitalization and 
spelling original unless bracketed).) In his affidavit Fisher explained that the Rule 
404(b) claim was for failure to seek suppression of evidence because the police 
officer "did not reveal" himself to be a police officer. (R., pp. 6, 8-9.) The affidavit 
also asserted problems with the ethnic make-up of the jury and that bias arose 
because several jurors stated in voir dire they knew someone in law 
enforcement. (R., pp. 7-8.) Fisher did not move for appointment of counsel. 
(See generally R.) 
The district court provided notice of its intent to dismiss, based on a review 
of the pleadings, affidavit, and record of the underlying criminal case. (R., pp. 
20-31.) The court reasoned that I.R.E. 404(b) had no application to evidence 
gathered by the police officer after the stop; that the facts asserted by Fisher 
would not establish any grounds for suppression of evidence; and that there was 
no showing that any other evidence subject to exclusion under I.R.E. 404(b) had 
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been presented at trial. (R., pp. 25-26.) The court further concluded that Fisher 
failed to state any cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in jury 
selection. (R., pp. 27-30.) 
Fisher responded to the notice by mostly reiterating his claims as already 
asserted. (R., pp. 39-48.) The district court thereafter entered an order 
dismissing the petition. (R., pp. 49-50.) Fisher timely appealed. (R., pp. 52-57.) 
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ISSUE 
Fisher provides a lengthy statement of issues that will not be reproduced 
here. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.) The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Fisher failed to show that the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Fisher Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A Introduction 
The district court dismissed Fisher's petition because "Petitioner is not 
entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings." 
(R., p. 31.) On appeal Fisher asserts that he demonstrated ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failing to strike biased jurors. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.) Fisher 
has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in jury selection. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
C. Fisher Has Failed To Show Any Evidence Of Juror Bias 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). A petition for post-conviction relief must 
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contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for 
a complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 
8). Instead, the petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal 
knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. kl (citing 
J.C. § 19-4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief 
application must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an 
evidentiary hearing. Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 
(Ct. App. 1999); Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct. 
App. 1982). 
Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). While a court must accept a petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the 
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or 
the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 
(citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). 
"Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief 
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or 
(2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." kl at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. 
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To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate: 1) that counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A 
reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error, 
not in hindsight, and presumes that "trial counsel was competent and that trial 
tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-
92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). Thus, the relevant question before this Court 
is whether Fisher presented admissible evidence to establish a prima facie 
showing that his counsel was both deficient as to jury selection and that such 
deficiency prejudiced him. 
Fisher's appellate argument is merely a litany of claimed grounds for 
challenging jurors in the case. He argues that "Juror Number twelve" was 
acquainted with attorneys, "good friends with the familys [sic]," had an aunt in law 
enforcement, and, due to an internship in the courthouse, had "knowledge of the 
law." (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) "Juror Number Four," Fisher claims, "has an uncle 
[who] has had a few D.U.l's." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) "Mr. K. O'Neil: has [a] 
great number of acquaintances, with D.U.I. offenders." (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) 
"Juror No. 5" is friends with an Idaho State Police Detective; "Juror No. 8" has 
attorneys and a judge in her family; "Juror No. 9 ... workes [sic] with Pocatello 
Police Department"; "Ms. Jones" is acquainted with officers and has a brother 
who is a prosecuting attorney. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
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Fisher's argument fails. First, many of Fisher's factual claims are 
ultimately shown to be false by the evidence. (See, ~. Appellant's brief, p. 12 
(claiming "Juror No. 9" works with the Pocatello Police Department when in fact 
she stated in voir dire that she works at a school and has dealt with the resource 
officers there (#34769 5/22/07 Tr., p. 40, L. 3 - p. 41, L. 21); claiming that juror 
Jones has a brother that is a "prosecuting attorney" when in fact he is a 
"practicing attorney in Las Vegas, Nevada" (#34769 5/22/07 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 15-
17)). More importantly, however, all of the allegations are merely that the jurors 
knew law enforcement officers, attorneys, or persons convicted of DUI. These 
allegations do not demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice because 
the evidence does not show that these jurors were in fact biased. 
When a post-conviction petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion in his underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the 
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the 
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State, 
127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995). A petitioner must also 
overcome the presumption that trial counsel's decision not to file a particular 
motion was strategic or tactical. See State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 816 
P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) (trial counsel's choice of witnesses, his manner of 
conducting cross-examination, and his lack of objection to testimony fall within 
the area of strategic or tactical decisions). Absent evidence of actual bias, 
counsel is not ineffective for failing to challenge a potential juror. Medrano v. 
State, 127 Idaho 639, 646, 903 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Ct. App. 1995). Here Fisher 
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has failed to show his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike any 
juror for bias because he has failed to present actual evidence of bias. He has 
therefore failed to make a prima facie showing of either deficient performance or 
prejudice. The district court properly dismissed the petition and Fisher has failed 
to show error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal 
of the petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2 
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